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This paper explicitly considers strategic interaction between governments to study cur-
rency competition and its eﬀects on the circulation of currencies and welfare in a two-country,
two-currency search theoretic model. Each government uses seigniorage to provide public
goods. Agents consume private goods, and the public goods of their own country. We have
several ﬁndings. The negative impact of a country’s inﬂationary policy on the realm of
circulation of its currency imposes an inﬂation discipline: the more open a country is, the
stronger is the discipline. The worldwide circulation of a currency increases seigniorage and
welfare and decreases the inﬂation rate of the issuing country compared to autarky. The
other country, since the tax base is reduced due to the use of foreign currency, raises its
inﬂation rate. However, there is a limit on the rate beyond which it cannot maintain the
circulation of national money. Under strategic interaction between governments in selecting
equilibrium, the larger country would try to lower the inﬂation rate to make its currency
circulate abroad, while the other country may also lower the inﬂation rate to sustain its
national currency as the sole medium of exchange.
∗We thank Kazuya Kamiya, Takashi Shimizu, Victor Rios-Rull, V.V. Chari and Shouyong Shi for valuable
comments.1 Introduction
Money, either minted or printed, has long been used to provide the economy with a means of
payment and to generate revenues for the governments to ﬁnance public spending. These two
functions of money issuance are interrelated with each other. If the government is a sole issuer
of currency, it is easier for it to collect seigniorage at the expense of providing a “stable” means
of payment than otherwise. In the ﬁfteenth century, for example, the Yuan dynasty enjoyed
the monopoly power of issuing paper money in China, paying little attention to the control
of inﬂation, until its economic and military power declined. On the other hand, if multiple
states issue monies, competition for wider circulation imposes an inﬂation discipline. In the
seventeenth century, the Spanish Monarchy pursued a policy of “price discrimination” among
its own Castillian currencies: it faced competition from other states minting large-denomination
coins, forcing it not to seek an additional short-term revenue, while petty coinage was a local
monopoly, allowing the Monarchy to collect a good amount of seigniorage (Motomura, 1994).
More recently, the United States, the country that would seem best able to impose a seigniorage
tax on foreigners,1 has a relatively stable monetary policy.2 These observations, especially the
U.S. case, have puzzled some economists who argued that an inﬂationary bias is inevitable in
an environment where the tax burden falls partially on foreigners.3 Intuitively speaking, their
models ignored the aspect of currency competition to attract their “users”. While an inﬂation tax
on a currency is an eﬃcient means to collect revenues in the short-run, it may diminish its value
and realm of circulation in the long-run. To better understand the above observations, therefore,
we need a model with endogenous determination of the realms of circulation of currencies.
This paper studies currency competition between governments and its eﬀects on the circu-
1Jeﬀerson (1998) computes seigniorage estimates in US and found that in the early 1990s the seigniorage
contributed by the rest of the world has even surpassed the domestic contribution. This could also be viewed as
a cost for not providing stable national currency in emerging and transition economies.
2According to Fisher (1982), in the United States seigniorage averaged about .5 percent of GNP and only 2
or 3 percent of total revenue collected between 1960 and 1978. Seigniorage tax accounted for about 15 percent of
total revenue between 1973 and 1978 in Italy, of which the currency is not a ‘vehicle’ currency.
3For example, Canzoneri (1989) uses a two-country model with cash-in-advance constraints to show that a
government will opt for an inﬂation bias if the tax burden falls partially on foreigners. Cooper and Kempf (2003)
uses a two-country overlapping generations model to show gains from a monetary union due to reduced transaction
costs and low inﬂation rates.
1lation of currencies and welfare levels in a two-country, two-currency search theoretic model
due to Matsuyama et al. (1993).4 Each country consists of inﬁnitely-lived private agents and
a government. A representative agent obtains utility from private good, and the public good
of his own country. Each government prints ﬁat money, taxes on money holdings, and uses
seigniorage to purchase private goods and provide public goods. Agents interact with home and
foreign agents with diﬀerent frequencies, reﬂecting the relative country size and the degree of
international economic integration. Agents choose which money to hold to conduct trade. In so
doing, they take into account the relative frequency of trade, which may diﬀer across currencies,
and the risk of conﬁscation (a proxy for inﬂation) that each currency is subject to.5
We ﬁrst study the eﬀects of inﬂation taxes on the circulation of currencies. If the degree
of economic integration is suﬃciently low, there exists an equilibrium where the two national
currencies circulate only locally. We call this situation autarky. The higher the degree of
economic integration becomes, the more likely is one of the currencies to circulate internationally.
In particular, the larger country is more likely to have its currency circulate internationally than
the smaller country. We ﬁnd that the higher the inﬂation rate on a given currency is, the
less likely is it to circulate locally and internationally. More speciﬁcally, the greater the foreign
inﬂation tax is relative to home inﬂation tax, the more attractive home currency becomes relative
to foreign currency, and therefore, the higher incentive agents have to use home currency. A
suﬃciently high inﬂation tax eliminates its chance of domestic circulation as well as worldwide
circulation. Therefore, the negative impact of a country’s inﬂationary policy on the circulation
of its currency imposes an inﬂation discipline. This is one of the issues that cannot be analyzed
in a framework with no endogenous emergence of an international currency.
We then consider a policy game. We ﬁrst study a situation in which all the agents and
4There are preceding works using search-theoretic models to study the issues of international currency. Zhou
(1997) considers preference shocks to induce currency exchange in a framework similar to Matsuyama et al. (1993).
Wright and Trejos (2001) considers a search model with divisible goods to study the determination of exchange
rate. Curtis and Waller (2003) shows how currency restrictions and government transactions policy aﬀect the
values of ﬁat currencies in a two-country model. Ravikumar and Wallace (2002) shows that a uniform currency
can eliminate inferior equilibria associated with distinct currencies.
5Previous studies on how trade frictions and government policy inﬂuence the circulation and value of a medium
of exchange include Li (1995), Aiyagari and Wallace (1997) and Li and Wright (1998). In Li (1995) the government
taxing ﬁat money holding increases the risk (cost) of holding money, which we adopt here as the proxy for inﬂation.
2the governments believe a particular equilibrium to prevail, and the two governments choose
tax rates simultaneously, measuring the payoﬀ of each government by the utility of its own
representative agent. For the country that issues the international currency, two opposing forces
aﬀect the optimal inﬂation rate: the enlarged tax base, and the tax burden that falls partially
on foreigners. If the former eﬀect dominates the latter, we observe a lower inﬂation rate on a
currency circulating abroad than under autarky. The country with the local currency, on the
contrary, has an incentive to raise the inﬂation rate to collect seigniorage, because the tax base
shrinks due to the use of foreign currency. However, the possibility of abandoning the use of
home currency provides a force to curb the inﬂation tendency. The force is stronger as the
degree of “openness” facing the country is higher, since this increases the gains of using foreign
currency.6
As for the welfare issue, a country that successfully has its currency to circulate abroad
will enjoy higher welfare than under autarky: both the amount of public good provided and
private consumption are higher, since it can collect seigniorage from foreigners, and the trade
opportunities expand. The other country, however, may not beneﬁt from the circulation of
foreign currency. The resulting change in welfare depends on the positive eﬀect of an increase
in trade opportunity and the negative eﬀect of losing the tax base. If the degree of “openness”
facing the country is suﬃciently small, using foreign currency is not beneﬁcial because the
seigniorage is partially taken away, while there is little beneﬁt from trade.
We also consider the situation where both governments choose inﬂation tax rates, under-
standing the possibility that their choices aﬀect which type of equilibrium to prevail. Although
the outcome depends on the details of the policy game, we are still able to make some predictions
on the equilibrium selection and provide economic intuition. One of the key ﬁndings is that the
larger country may try to make its currency circulate internationally by lowering the inﬂation
tax. Knowing this, the smaller country has an incentive to prevent its tax base from diminishing
by lowering its tax rate accordingly. As a result, it would raise less revenue than when there is
no such strategic interaction. In return, it can ensure the existence of the equilibrium it prefers.
6Romer (1993) ﬁnds negative correlation between openness and inﬂation and argues that the absence of
precommitment in monetary policy leading to excessive inﬂation is the underlying mechanism. Here we provide
another mechanism: the negative impact of a country’s inﬂationary policy on the realm of circulation of its
currency imposes an inﬂation discipline, and the higher the degree of openness is, the stronger is the discipline.
3One interesting question is the following: will a government raise the inﬂation rate after it has
successfully made its national currency circulate abroad? We ﬁnd that this time-inconsistency
problem is not likely to arise if the “degree of openness” is suﬃciently high, since in this case, the
government can make the currency attractive enough to foreigners without lowering too much
the inﬂation rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3
discusses the existence and properties of various types of equilibria under inﬂation tax policy.
In section 4, we study currency competition between governments and its eﬀects on welfare.
Section 5 discusses strategic selection of equilibrium. Section 6 concludes with suggestions for
possible modiﬁcations and extensions.
2 The Basic Model
The Environment
Time is discrete and the horizon is inﬁnite. There is a [0,1] continuum of inﬁnitely-lived
agents with unit mass. The agents are divided into two regions, Home and Foreign. Let n ∈ (0,1)
be the size of Home population. There are k (k ≥ 3) types of indivisible goods. Within
each economy, there are equal proportions of k types of agents, who specialize in consumption,
production and storage. A type i agent derives utility only from consuming type i good and
can produce only good i + 1 (mod k). Agent i can only store his production good costlessly
up to one unit; he can neither produce nor store other types of goods. Hence, there is no
double coincidence of wants. Let u>0 be the instantaneous utility from consuming an agent’s
consumption good and δ his discount rate.
There are two distinguishable ﬁat money, Home currency and Foreign currency. Each cur-
rency is indivisible. An agent can store only one unit of good or one unit of currency at a time.
Let mh (mf) denote the fraction of Home agents holding the Home (Foreign) currency. The
inventory distribution of Home agents can be summarized by X =( 1−mh −mf,m h,m f). Like-
wise, let m∗
h (m∗
f) denote the fraction of Foreign agents holding the Home (Foreign) currency.





Let m and m∗ ∈ (0,1) denote the supply of the Home currency per Home agent and that of
4Foreign currency per Foreign agent, respectively. Then,
nm = nmh +( 1− n)m∗
h, (1 − n)m∗ = nmf +( 1− n)m∗
f.
Agents are matched randomly in pairs, but not in a uniform fashion. Let β ∈ (0,1). A Home
agent meets another Home agent with probability n, and meets a Foreign agent with probability
β(1 − n). A Foreign agent meets a Home and another Foreign agent with probability βn and
(1−n), respectively. Thus, agents who live in diﬀerent countries meet less frequently than a pair
of agents who live in the same country. Note that the above description implies the probability
of meeting a trade partner also depends on the size of country. We can interpret β as the degree
of economic integration or a measure of the trading frictions in international trade. An increase
in β reduces international trade frictions, because higher β makes it easier to meet with foreign
citizens. Similarly, a higher n not only makes it easier for the Home agents to meet with their
fellow citizens but also makes it easier for Foreign to trade with Home agents. That is, a higher
n increases the economies of scale in transactions with Home agents. However, an increase in n
reduces the relative size of Foreign country and so increases the local trade frictions in Foreign
country.
Trade entails a one-for-one swap of inventories, and takes place if and only if both agents
agree to trade. The trade partner’s type and inventory are observable, trade histories are not.
Agents are unable to commit to future actions, and proposed transfers cannot be enforced.
Thus, people trade when there is a single coincidence of wants, and all trades involve the use of
a tangible medium of exchange.
The role of government in the provision of public goods
In each country there is a government whose role is to print ﬁat money, tax money holdings
and provide public goods from the private goods that it purchases. An agent who holds Home
(Foreign) currency is subject to a probability τh (τf) that his money would be conﬁscated by
the government of Home (Foreign) country. The rate τh (τf) can be interpreted as a tax rate
that a government imposes on money holdings in order to provide public goods. We can also
interpret τh (τf) as inﬂationary tax.
When a Home currency holder and a commodity holder are matched and about to trade,
a Home government agent steps in with probability τh, conﬁscating money from the money
holder and purchasing the commodity from the commodity holder. The same arrangement is
5made for Foreign government. In this series of moves, the money holder loses what he had
without obtaining his consumption good and goes back to the status of holding commodity, the
commodity holder becomes money holder just like when he trades with the private agent, and
the government obtains the commodity.
The government transforms the private goods it purchases into public goods from which
every private agent in the country enjoys the utility of φ(G) where G is the total quantity of
private goods purchased by the government in a unit of time. We assume φ(0) = 0,φ  (G) →∞
as G → 0,φ  (G) > 0 and φ
  
(G) < 0. Public goods are nonstorable (e.g., army service).7
Strategies and equilibria
An agent chooses trade strategies to maximize his expected discounted utility, taking as
given others’ strategies and the distribution of inventories. We restrict our attention to pure
strategies which only depend on his nationality and the objects he and his trading partner have





1 if he trades object a for b
0 otherwise,
where a,b = g,h, or f,and a  = b. Similarly, the Foreign agent’s trade strategy is given by s∗
ab =0
or 1. We consider only time-independent strategies. Given that the physical environment is
stationary and the planning horizon is inﬁnite, we can therefore conﬁne our attention to steady-
state equilibrium.
Let Vg,V h and Vf denote the expected discounted utility to a Home agent holding his
production good, the Home currency, and Foreign currency, respectively. Let Pab (P∗
ab) denote
the transition probability with which a Home (Foreign) agent switches his inventory from object
a to object b. Then, the Bellman’s equations are
Vg = [(1 − Pgh − Pgf)Vg + PghVh + PgfVf]/(1 + δ), (1)
Vh =[ τhPhgVg +( 1− τh)Phg(u + Vg)+( 1− Phg − Phf)Vh + PhfVf]/(1 + δ), (2)
Vf =[ τfPfgVg +( 1− τf)Pfg(u + Vg)+PfhVh +( 1− Pfg − Pfh)Vf]/(1 + δ). (3)
7We may assume that Home government and Foreign government have diﬀerent eﬃciency in providing public
goods; e.g., the quantity of public goods G is a fraction γ of total consumption goods purchased by the government,
and both countries may have diﬀerent γ’s. We may also assume that Home and Foreign agents have diﬀerent
preferences for public goods.
6Note that the ﬁrst terms in the RHS of equality in (2) and (3) imply that, if an agent’s currency
is conﬁscated by the issuing government (with probability τh and τf that his money is conﬁscated
by Home and Foreign government, respectively), his value becomes that of holding production
good. The value functions and strategies must satisfy the following incentive compatibility
constraints:
sgb =1 i ﬀ Vg <V b (b = h or f),
sag =1 i ﬀ Va <u+ Vg (a = h or f),
sab =1 i ﬀ Va <V b (a,b = h or f).
For example, Vg >V f is the suﬃcient and necessary condition for a Home agent not to trade
his production good for Foreign currency.
We restrict our attention to the equilibrium where agents always accept their local currency;
i.e., Home currency is accepted by the Home agents and Foreign currency is accepted by the
Foreign agents. We are left four types of equilibria – no international currency, Foreign currency
is the only international currency, Home currency is the only international currency and both
currencies circulate in both countries. We characterize the existence conditions in terms of β
and n, the extent of international and local trade frictions, as well as tax rates τh and τf.
First of all, in any of these equilibria, we have Pfh = Phf = P∗
fh = P∗
hf = 0. Given the tie-
breaking rule, no two agents in the same country exchange Home currency and Foreign currency;
indeed, for currency exchange to occur between two, say, Home agents, we need shf = sfh =1 ,
which implies Vf >V h and Vh >V f: a contradiction. Therefore, the only possibility for currency
exchange is between agents from diﬀerent countries. Due to the nature of equilibrium, this may
happen only when both currencies circulate worldwide. In this case, we need to have, say,
Vh >V f and V ∗
f >V ∗
h (the opposite case has a similar consequence). If τh = τf holds, then
the two currencies are perfect substitutes, and therefore, Vh = Vf and V ∗
f = V ∗
h , which is a
contradiction. But, if, say, τh becomes smaller (resp. greater) than τf, then Home currency is
more (resp. less) attractive for both Home and Foreign agents than Foreign currency. Thus,
both Home and Foreign agents have the same incentive concerning the acceptance of currency,
and therefore, there is no room for currency exchange.
Before conducting equilibrium analysis, let us calculate the value functions from (1), (2) and
7(3):
Vg =[ ( δ + Pfg)(1 − τh)PghPhg +( δ + Phg)(1 − τf)PgfPfg]u/P, (4)
Vh = [(1 − τh)[(δ + Pgh)(δ + Pfg)+δPgf]+( 1− τf)PgfPfg)]Phgu/P, (5)
Vf = [(1 − τf)[(δ + Pgf)(δ + Phg)+δPgh]+( 1− τh)PghPhg)]Pfgu/P, (6)
where
P = δ [(δ + Pgh + Phg)(δ + Pfg)+Pgf(δ + Phg)].
Using the above value functions, we are able to state some general results.
Proposition 2.1. In a steady-state equilibrium,
1. u + Vg >V g,V h,V f.
2. max{Vh,V f} >V g.
3. Vh > (<)Vg iﬀ (1 − τh)Phg(δ + Pfg + Pgf) > (<)(1 − τf)PgfPfg.
4. Vf > (<)Vg iﬀ (1 − τf)Pfg(δ + Phg + Pgh) > (<)(1 − τh)PghPhg.
The same relations hold for a Foreign agent, with relevant variables starred.
3 Equilibria
3.1 Equilibrium with two local currencies: Equilibrium A
In this equilibrium a Home agent trades his production good for the Home currency, the Home
currency for his consumption good, but does not accept Foreign currency (u + Vg >V h >V g ≥
Vf). A Foreign agent trades his production good for the Foreign currency, the Foreign currency





h ). There is no international currency and no international trade in this equilibrium. The
inventory distributions are given by X =( 1−m,m,0) and X∗ =( 1−m∗,m ∗,0). The transition
probabilities in this equilibrium for a Home agent are:
Pgh = nm/k, Phg = n(1 − m)/k
Pfg = β(1 − n)(1 − m∗)/k, Pgf = Phf = Pfh =0 .
(7)
8Note that Pgh incorporates the opportunity to sell goods to acquire money from private agents
and Home government with probabilities nm(1 − τh)/k and nmτh/k, respectively. If a Home
agent ever holds Foreign currency, then given others’ strategies the chance that he can acquire
consumption goods is from trading with Foreign sellers, of which probability is (1 − τf)Pfg =
β(1 − n)(1 − τf)(1 − m∗)/k. Similarly, the transition probabilities for a Foreign agent are:
P∗
gf =( 1− n)m∗/k, P∗
fg =( 1− n)(1 − m∗)/k
P∗





To ﬁnd the existence conditions for Equilibrium A, we verify the incentive constraints u+Vg >




h . From Proposition 2.1, Vg ≥ Vf and V ∗
g ≥ V ∗
h imply








Likewise, Foreign agents do not accept Home currency, or V ∗
g ≥ V ∗




m∗(1 − m∗)(1 − n)2




In the sequel, we focus on the case where agents are suﬃciently patient relative to matching



















Given parameter values of m,m∗,k,τ h, and τf,β≤ βA, β ≤ β∗
A give the existence conditions
of equilibrium A on (n,β) space, shown in Figure 1.8 The region of existence of Equilibrium A
on (n,β)-space depends on the ratio (1 − τh)/(1 − τf). The less (1 − τh)/(1 − τf) is, the less is
βA and the greater is β∗
A. In other words, as τh increases and/or τf decreases, the locus β = βA
shifts downward, while the locus β = β∗
A shifts upward (see Figure 1). If we interpret (τh,τ f)
as a proxy for the rate of inﬂation, then this change is intuitive. The less (1 − τh)/(1 − τf) is,
8The parameters are m = m
∗ = .3,k=1 0 ,u=1 .
9the less attractive Home currency becomes relative to Foreign currency, and therefore, the less
(resp. more) incentive agents have to use Home currency (resp. Foreign currency).
The downward shift of βA implies that under an inﬂationary policy, staying autarchy is not
the best response unless the population size of the country is big enough to oﬀset the negative
impacts due to the risk of conﬁscating currency. Thus, for a given pair of (n,β), if a country
adopts too high an inﬂation tax rate, it may destroy the equilibrium with two currency areas.
Given a policy pair (τh,τ f), if the degree of economic integration is suﬃciently small, national
currency circulates only locally; there is no international currency and no international trade.
Other things being equal, this equilibrium is less likely to survive if the country size is more
uneven. If n is suﬃciently large, the trade with Home agents is so easy that Foreign agents
would have incentives to use Home currency. For a given n, Equilibrium A does not exist when
β is suﬃciently high, either. The higher the degree of economic integration becomes, the easier
trade with foreigners, and the higher the incentive to accept foreign currency becomes.
3.2 Equilibria with one local currency and one international currency: Equi-
libria F and H
We discuss the existence conditions for Equilibrium F, where Home currency is accepted only
in Home country, while Foreign currency circulates in both Home and Foreign country as an
international medium of exchange. Equilibrium H is the mirror image of Equilibrium F and can
be characterized in a similar manner.
Equilibrium F requires u + Vg >V h,V f >V g and u + V ∗
g >V∗
f >V∗
g ≥ V ∗
h . When agents
follow these strategies, mh = m and so X =( 1− m − mf,m,m f) and X∗ =( 1− m∗
f,0,m ∗
f).
The steady state requires that the ratios of commodity holders to the Foreign currency holders







1 − m − mf
.
From the steady state condition, mf =( 1− m)m∗
f. Therefore we can rewrite the inventory
distributions in terms of m∗
f as X = ((1−m)(1−m∗
f),m,(1−m)m∗
f) and X∗ =( 1−m∗
f,0,m ∗
f).
The total supply of Foreign currency must equal the total amount circulates in both countries
(1 − n)m∗ = n(1 − m)m∗
f +( 1− n)m∗
f =( 1− nm)m∗
f. (11)




Phg = n(1 − m)(1 − m∗
f)/k,
Pfg = B(1 − m∗
f)/k,
Phf = Pfh =0 ,
(12)





hg = βn(1 − m)(1 − m∗
f)/k,
P∗







where B∗ = βn(1 − m)+( 1− n), and m∗
f satisﬁes (11).
From Proposition 2.1, it suﬃces to check that Home agents accept Home currency (Vg <V h),
and that Foreign agents do not accept Home currency (V ∗
g ≥ V ∗
h ).
First, substituting (12) into the third and forth claims of Proposition 2.1, and taking the
limit of δ going to zero, we have Vh >V g iﬀ




























Equilibrium F exists if and only if the two incentive constraints hold, given (12), (13) and (11).
We depict the equilibrium region deﬁned by (14) and (15) on the space of (n,β) in Figure 2.
Given other parameters, an increase in τh leads to a decrease in βF, while an increase in τf leads
to an increase in βF. Likewise, an increase in τh leads to an increase in β∗
F, while an increase in
τf leads to a decrease in β∗
F. Hence, the higher the Home inﬂation tax is (or similarly, the lower
Foreign inﬂation tax is), the less likely Home and Foreign agents are to use Home currency.
113.3 Equilibrium with two international currencies: Equilibrium U
In this equilibrium, both currencies circulate side by side, i.e., they are both universally accepted:




g . When agents follow these strategies, X = X∗,
and mh = m∗
h = nm, and mf = m∗
f =( 1− n)m∗. The transition probabilities are
Pgh = nm[n + β(1 − n)]/k,
Pgf =[ n + β(1 − n)](1 − n)m∗/k,
Phg = Pfg =[ n + β(1 − n)][1 − nm − (1 − n)m∗]/k,
P∗
gh = nm[βn+( 1− n)]/k,
P∗
gf =[ βn+( 1− n)](1 − n)m∗/k,
P∗
hg = P∗
fg =[ βn+( 1− n)][1 − nm − (1 − n)m∗]/k,




Given any τh > 0 and τf > 0,V h >V g (⇔ V ∗
h >V∗







and Vf >V g (⇔ V ∗
f >V∗





1 − (1 − n)m∗. (18)










If the tax rate of, say, Home currency is suﬃciently high in comparison with that of Foreign
currency, then agents start rejecting Home currency, and the more Foreign currency balance we
have, the lower this threshold is since each agent can have Foreign currency relatively quickly
after he rejects Home currency.
This result is in contrast to Matsuyama et al (1993) in which the uniﬁed currency equilibrium
exists for all parameter values. The reason for this diﬀerence is that currencies are no longer
perfect substitutes even in this equilibrium if the tax rates are diﬀerent. Indeed, if τh = τf
holds, then the two currencies become perfect substitutes, and such an equilibrium exists under
all parameter values.
124 Policies and Welfare
The following two sections discuss currency competition between governments and its eﬀects on
welfare and the determination of currency regimes.
The welfare of Home country (resp. Foreign country), denoted by W (resp. W∗), consists
of the long-run expected (average) value of each agent in Home (resp. Foreign) country from
private transactions and the payoﬀ stream of the representative Home (resp. Foreign) agent
obtained from public goods. To be concrete, we use the following speciﬁcations:
W ≡ δ[(1 − mh − mf)Vg + mhVh + mfVf]+nφ(G)
=[ mh(1 − τh)Phg + mf(1 − τf)Pfg]u + nφ((mhPhg + m∗
hP∗
hg)τh), (19)












fg]u +( 1− n)φ((mfPfg + m∗
fP∗
fg)τf), (20)
where G =( mhPhg+βm∗
hP∗
hg)τh and G∗ =( βmfPfg+m∗
fP∗
fg)τf are the total amounts of public
goods, measured by private goods, in each period provided by Home and Foreign governments,
respectively. Using these values as the payoﬀs of the respective governments, we analyze a
situation where the two countries use the tax rates and, in some case, money balances as policy
instruments. We ﬁrst conﬁne our attention to each type of equilibrium, and then consider a
regime change from one type of equilibrium to another, e.g., equilibrium A to F.
In the sequel, we sometimes use
φ(G)=αlnG (21)
to obtain a closed form solution.
4.1 Equilibrium A
Consider an interior solution to the policy game where all the agents as well as governments
believe Equilibrium A to prevail. Substituting transition probabilities (7) into (19), and diﬀer-







(1 − τh)nu + nφ (·)τh
 
(1 − 2m)=0 . (22)
Therefore, the optimal money balance is mA =1 /2. Similarly, we have m∗A =1 /2 for Foreign
money balance where the superscript “A” stands for Equilibrium A. Diﬀerentiating (19) with











nφ (mA(1 − mA)nτA
h /k)=u. (23)
Similarly, we have
(1 − n)φ (m∗A(1 − m∗A)(1 − n)τA
f /k)=u. (24)























Note that this solution exists if and only if 4kα < u, which we assume hereafter.
4.2 Equilibrium F
We conduct an analysis similar to the previous subsection, albeit more complicated than that.
We assume that the governments believe Equilibrium F to prevail. Also, to simplify the illus-
tration in this subsection, we assume that n<1/2 holds.
14First of all, if we diﬀerentiate W∗ with respect to m∗












f =1 /2. Therefore, the optimal money balance for Foreign country is given
by m∗
f =1 /2. On the other hand, the optimal balance of Home currency is not independent of
other parameters. In the sequel, we let m∗
f =1 /2 and m =¯ m as given and examine the policy
game where τh and τf are chosen simultaneously.9
Foreign country’s problem is straightforward, which is to choose τf to maximize W∗. Diﬀer-



















β(1 − ¯ m)B + B∗u. (27)

















is the degree of “openness” of Foreign country.
This implies that Foreign country has a lower inﬂation rate when its currency becomes an
international currency than otherwise. Note that we have two opposing forces. If we look into
the arguments of φ  of both (24) and (27) at m∗A = m∗F
f =1 /2, we notice that (1 − n) <
β(1 − ¯ m)B + B∗. This inequality implies that the tax base for Foreign currency is larger in
Equilibrium F than in Equilibrium A, which gives the government an incentive to reduce the
inﬂation rate. On the other hand, the right hand side of (24) is greater than that of (27). This
corresponds to the extent to which Foreign government can raise revenue from Home agents,
9We may consider a two stage game where m
∗
f and m are chosen ﬁrst and τh and τf are chosen secondly. One
can think of ¯ m as a solution to such a problem, though we do not explicitly solve for ¯ m.
15which gives it an incentive to raise the inﬂation rate.10 Under the current speciﬁcation, however,
the eﬀect of an increased tax base dominates that of collecting seigniorage from Home agents.
Home country is faced with the constraint that its currency has to be accepted by Home
agents, i.e., β ≤ βF. Thus, its problem is given by
max
τh≥0
W s.t. β ≤ βF, given m =¯ m, (29)
where βF and W come from (14) and (19) together with (12). Solving this problem in the







¯ m(1 − ¯ m)
kα
u
































(1 − ¯ m).
If the degree of “openness” is not too high, or θ<¯ θ, Home country can freely choose its tax







In other words, the country with local currency has an incentive to raise its tax rate to collect
seigniorage due to the internationalization of Foreign currency. If the degree of integration
proceeds further, or θ ∈ (¯ θ,Θ), then β = βF becomes binding: an inﬂation discipline is needed
in order to keep Home currency in circulation. Beyond Θ, equilibrium F no longer exists since
even if Home government sets τh = 0, Home agents have no incentive to accept Home currency.11
10The right hand side of (27) represents the relative utility sacriﬁce from private consumption of foreign agents
due to the inﬂation tax. This ratio is less than 1 in equilibrium F because the tax burden falls partially on Home
agents, and this creates incentive to adopt a higher tax rate.
11Note that while ¯ θ<Θ and Θ > 0 always hold, ¯ θ can be negative. If this is the case, (30) is reduced to
τ
F
h =1− (1 − τ
F
f )[1 + θ/(1 − ¯ m)]/2 for θ<Θ.
164.3 Equilibrium U
The analysis of this equilibrium is easier than that of equilibrium F. Indeed, it is veriﬁed that









m∗[βn+( 1− n)][1 − nm − (1 − n)m∗]u
, (32)
provided that (31) (resp. (32)) satisﬁes (17) (resp. (18)); for if not, Home (resp. Foreign)
currency would not be accepted by anyone. Therefore, if (17) is violated, it is Home government
that lowers the inﬂation rate to meet the constraint, i.e.,
τU






f is given by (32). Similarly, if (18) is violated, then we have
τU
f =1− (1 − τU
h )
nm
1 − (1 − n)m∗, (34)
where τU
h is given by (31).
In order to compare them with the corresponding rates in equilibria A and F, we let m =




f hold.13 Both countries have
incentives to increase the tax rates to collect seigniorage from the other country. One can also
verify that ∂τU
h /∂θ < 0 and ∂τU
f /∂θ∗ < 0, i.e., as the degree of “openness” increases, optimal
tax rate under equilibrium U would be lower. If n<1/2, then we have τU
f <τ U
h , i.e., the
government of the larger country imposes a lower inﬂation rate than that of the smaller country.
12It is veriﬁed that while W + W
∗ is maximized at m = m
∗ =1 /2, ∂W/∂m > 0a tm = m
∗ =1 /2. We hold
that m and m
∗ are not policy variables, but historically determined ones.
















































[βn(3 − n)+n(1 − n)] > 0.
174.4 Welfare comparisons
This subsection compares equilibria A, F, and U in terms of welfare. Let us compare equilibria
A and F ﬁrst. To begin with, it is obvious from (20) that W∗ is larger in equilibrium F than
in equilibrium A. This is fairly intuitive since both the trade opportunity and the tax base are
larger in the former than in the latter.
On the other hand, the direction of change in W is unclear since we have the positive eﬀect
of an increase in trade opportunity and the negative eﬀect of losing the tax base. These eﬀects
change as the “openness” of Home country changes.
Suppose that θ,o rβ, is close to zero. We evaluate W and W∗ at mA = m∗F
f =1 /2 and

































































One can show that
WF − WA|β=0 = −nm2u/4k − αn(1 − m)2 < 0.
Thus, if the “openness” is suﬃciently low, then equilibrium A is preferred to equilibrium F by
Home country. This is because the seigniorage is partially taken away by Foreign government,
while there is little beneﬁt from trade.
If the “openness” of Home country increases, this may not be the case. To see this, we
evaluate WA and WF at β = βA ≡ n/2(1 − n). Its sign is ambiguous, but we have numerical
examples of both cases, WF − WA > 0 and WF − WA < 0, as shown in Table 1.
18α =1 ,k=1 0 ,u= 1000,θ= .5 α =1 ,k=6 ,u= 100,θ= .5
¯ m =0 .2 ¯ m =0 .4
n 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
τA
f (τA
h ) 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
τF
h 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.3025 0.2993 0.2918 0.2775
τF
f 0.0398 0.0390 0.0373 0.034 0.2391 0.2356 0.2275 0.2118
τU
h 0.2667 0.1333 0.0889 0.0667 0.6519 0.6848 0.5333 0.4000
τU
f 0.0442 0.0485 0.0523 0.0546 0.2650 0.2909 0.3140 0.3273
WA 1.4790 3.0966 4.7665 6.4704 -0.3741 -0.6096 -0.7927 -0.9419
WF 2.2755 2.1951 2.1696 2.1821 -0.3923 -0.6448 -0.8420 -0.9991
WU 2.7206 5.718 8.8400 12.073 -0.2828 -0.3681 -0.3381 -0.1726
W∗A 15.288 13.495 11.715 9.949 -1.3895 -1.3293 -1.2566 -1.1696
W∗F 15.405 14.020 13.060 12.723 -1.372 -1.251 -1.057 -0.763
W∗U 14.832 13.606 12.896 12.938 -1.6040 -1.6604 -1.4151 -0.9582
Table 1: equilibria A, F, U if β = βA
19Next, we study equilibrium U in comparison with other equilibria. We have
WU − WA|β=0 = −αn(1 + lnn),
WU − WF|β=0 = αnm(−2+m)+nm2u − αnlnn,
W∗U − W∗A|β=0 = −α(1 − n)[1 + ln(1 − n)],
W∗U − W∗F|β=0 = −α(1 − n)[1 + ln(1 − nm(2 − m))].
If β is close to zero, there is no gain from trade and so the signs of WU −WA and W∗U −W∗A
depend upon the relative country size: WU −WA|β=0 > 0i ﬀn<1/e, and W∗U −W∗A|β=0 > 0
iﬀ n>1−1/e. In other words, the smaller the country size is, the more likely it is to gain by the
global circulation of both currencies. The reason is simple: if the country size is small, it can
obtain huge seigniorage from abroad provided that it succeeds in circulating its own currency,
the diﬃculty of which is, of course, a diﬀerent question.
If the country size is about the same, or 1/e < n < 1 − 1/e, then both countries lose due to
the change from equilibrium A to equilibrium U. The situation exhibits the one similar to the
prisoner’s dilemma, i.e., WU − WA|β=0 < 0 and W∗U − W∗A|β=0 < 0.
The sign of WU − WF|β=0 is ambiguous but one can show that it is positive as long as
u is suﬃciently large. Since we know W∗F − W∗A|β=0 > 0 and W∗U − W∗F|β=0 > 0i ﬀ
n<(1 − 1/e)/(2¯ m − ¯ m2), in the neighborhood of β = 0, we have
WU >W A >W F,
W∗F >W ∗A >W ∗U,
if n<1/e,
WA >W U >W F,
W∗F >W ∗A >W ∗U,
if 1/e < n < 1 − 1/e,
WA >W U >W F,
W∗F >W ∗U >W ∗A,
if 1 − 1/e < n < (1 − 1/e)/(2¯ m − ¯ m2) and
WA >W U >W F,
W∗U >W ∗F >W ∗A,
20if n>(1 − 1/e)/(2¯ m − ¯ m2).
If β is relatively large, we do not have such a clear relationship since we now have another
eﬀect, gains from trade.14 In order to compare across equilibria, we assume that β = βA, which
is the greatest β for which equilibrium A exists. In this case, we have some numerical examples
shown in Table 1.
5 Strategic selection of equilibrium and time inconsistency
In the previous sections, we conﬁne our attention to the situations the governments believe a
certain equilibrium to prevail and try to meet the constraint it faces to sustain the equilibrium.
This section goes one step further, albeit not technically rigorous, and considers a situation in
which the governments choose the tax rates, understanding the possibility that their choices
aﬀect the type of equilibrium to prevail. Unlike other sections, this section is illustrative rather
than analytical.
We focus on the equilibrium selection between equilibria A and F. For this purpose, assume
n<1/2, and that β ≤ βA holds under τh = τf =4 kα/u. Assume further that m = m∗ =1 /2
if equilibrium A prevails, and that m∗
f =1 /2 and m =¯ m if equilibrium F prevails. We ﬁnally
assume that equilibrium A initially prevails.15
We assume that once Home agents start accepting Foreign currency, this process continues
until equilibrium F prevails with the money balances as assumed, and the governments care only
about the ﬁnal (stationary) outcome.
Let us ﬁx τh =4 kα/u for the moment and consider the incentive of Foreign government. In
order to have equilibrium F, Foreign government lowers τf to make Foreign currency attractive
to Home agents. This happens if β>β A occurs under (τh,τ f)=( 4 kα/u,τf). From (9), the





There are two questions that are of particular interest. The ﬁrst is whether or not Foreign
14To be precise, this is not the standard gains from trade due to comparative advantages; rather, it is gains
from trade opportunities.
15Note that which equilibrium prevails initially is crucial in the present analysis since the process from, say,
equilibrium A to equilibrium F is irreversible.
21government raises the tax rate from ¯ τf after equilibrium F prevails, i.e., whether the time
inconsistency problem arises or not. We can examine it by comparing ¯ τf with τF
f as given in
the previous section. Subtracting (28) from (35), we obtain















By deﬁnition, θ = θ∗ =0a tβ = 0, and θ =1 /2a tβ = βA under τh = τf. Therefore, we
have ¯ τf <τ F
f if θ is close to zero since 4kα/u < 1, and ¯ τf >τ F
f if θ is close to a half. As the
degree of “openness” facing Home country is higher, there is larger gains from accepting Foreign
currency, and this oﬀsets partially the negative eﬀect due to a higher τf and thus, allows for a
higher threshold ¯ τf. In other words, the time inconsistency problem is less likely to arise if the
degree of “openness” is high. This also implies that, given other parameters, the larger Foreign
country is, the more likely it is the case that by choosing the optimal inﬂation rate it can ensure
the existence of its preferred equilibrium without facing the time inconsistency problem.
The second question is whether or not Home government has an incentive to prevent equi-
librium F from prevailing by lowering its tax rate as well. To begin with, Home government has
to set the rate as low as
¯ τh =1− 2θ(1 − τf)
for this purpose. As one may see, it depends upon Foreign government’s decision.
In order to analyze this situation, we need to specify a scenario or a game. We consider two
suggestive, but not necessarily most plausible, scenarios.16 The ﬁrst scenario is as follows:
Step 1. Home government chooses τh. After observing it, Foreign government chooses τf.
Step 2-a. If β ≤ βA holds under (τh,τ f) determined in Step 1, then equilibrium A prevails
under (τA
h ,τA
f )=( 4 kα/u,4kα/u) and m = m∗ =1 /2.




f =1 /2, and m =¯ m.
16We have chosen these scenarios not because they are most realistic, but because they are more tractable than
some other (more realistic) scenarios. For example, one may wonder why sequential moves are introduced in Step
1. If we modify it to a simultaneous move game, then in the ﬁrst scenario, we typically have multiple equilibria,
and in the second, we sometimes have no pure strategy equilibrium.
22In the ﬁrst scenario, the question is reduced to whether WF >W A or not since Foreign
government always prefers equilibrium F to A, i.e., W∗F >W∗A, and therefore, the comparison
that we made in the previous subsections directly applies. If WF >W A holds, then Home
government may intentionally raise the tax rate beyond τA
h in order to allow Foreign government
to choose a suﬃciently low tax rate to switch to equilibrium F.17 From (9) we know that, given
τh the threshold value of τf is ¯ τf =1− (1 − τh)/2θ. Note that ¯ τf > 0i ﬀn<2β/(2β +1− τh).
That is, given τh, the larger Foreign country is, the more likely equilibrium F is to prevail.
The second scenario is the one in which Step 2-a is replaced by the following:
Step 2-a’. If β ≤ βA holds under (τh,τ f) determined in Step 1, then equilibrium A prevails
under (τh,τ f) and m = m∗ =1 /2.
In the second scenario, Home government may have to pay an extra cost to maintain equilib-
rium A. Since Foreign government has an incentive to lower its tax rate as low as zero if doing so
leads to equilibrium F, Home government has to set ¯ τh at 1−2θ if it wishes to prevent the regime
change. The higher the degree of “openness” is, the larger is the gains from accepting Foreign
currency, and therefore, the higher is the cost for Home government to maintain equilibrium A.
Some numerical examples are shown in Table 2. In this table, cases (1)-(4) induce the same
equilibrium, F, in both scenarios. Home government prefers equilibrium F to A. In cases (1)
and (2), however, Foreign government cannot attain equilibrium F if Home government chooses
τA
h . Therefore, Home government sets its rate suﬃciently high so that Foreign government can
induce equilibrium F by choosing a suﬃciently low rate.
These scenarios sometimes induce diﬀerent results. See cases (5)-(8). They exhibit WF <
WA. Therefore, in the ﬁrst scenario, Home government chooses a suﬃciently low inﬂation rate to
prevent the change. In the second scenario, however, Home government has to commit to a low
tax rate to prevent equilibrium F, incurring an extra cost to keep the tax rate that would be non-
optimal had there been no concern for equilibrium selection. Consequently, Home government
17To be precise, we need to consider the possibility that equilibrium U would prevail. We assume that, when
Foreign government lowers the tax rate, it’s more likely that equilibrium F, rather than equilibrium U, would
prevail. The justiﬁcation of this assumption is that under a suﬃciently low τf, given that Home agents accept
Foreign currency, and that other Foreign agents do not accept Home currency, no Foreign agent would have an
incentive to deviate to accept Home currency.
23α =1 ,n= .2, ¯ m = .4
k =1 0 ,u= 1000 k =6 ,u= 100
case (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
θ 0.4 0.45 0.48 0.49 0.4 0.45 0.48 0.49
τA
f (τA
h ) 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
¯ τh 0.2 0.1 0.04 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.04 0.02
τF
h 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.3637 0.3315 0.3122 0.3057
τF
f 0.0398 0.0390 0.0373 0.0340 0.2391 0.2356 0.2275 0.2118
WA 3.0966 3.0966 3.0966 3.0966 -0.6096 -0.6096 -0.6096 -0.6096
¯ WA 3.0966 3.0966 3.0966 3.0579 -0.6127 -0.6680 -0.8013 -0.9232
WF 3.3783 3.5227 3.6093 3.6381 -0.6703 -0.6566 -0.6493 -0.6470
Scenario 1 Eqm F Eqm F Eqm F Eqm F Eqm A Eqm A Eqm A Eqm A
Scenario 2 Eqm F Eqm F Eqm F Eqm F Eqm ¯ A Eqm F Eqm F Eqm F
Table 2: Strategic equilibrium selection
may no longer wish to maintain equilibrium A. In case (5), it chooses ¯ τh since ¯ WA >WF holds.
However, in cases (6)-(8), since ¯ WA <W F holds, Home government does not choose ¯ τh but
some rate higher than that to allow Foreign government to implement equilibrium F.
246 Conclusion
The issues on currency competition have been discussed in many previous studies, yet there has
been few work modelling it in an environment with endogenous determination of the realms of
circulation of currencies and strategic interaction between money issuers. Studies that are silent
on the issue of endogenous emergence of an international medium of exchange cannot answer
the question as to how inﬂation taxes aﬀect the realms of circulation of currencies and how this
eﬀect serves an inﬂation discipline.
We have developed a framework to study currency competition between governments and
its eﬀects on the circulation of currencies and welfare levels in a two-country, two-currency
search theoretic model. This model provides us with some additional insights. For example,
the negative impact of a country’s inﬂationary policy on the realm of circulation of its currency
imposes an inﬂation discipline on the government: the more open a country is, the stronger is
the discipline. This result oﬀers another account for the empirical evidence that the degree of
“openness” is negatively correlated with inﬂation rates (Romer, 1993).
We also ﬁnd that, at least under the current speciﬁcation, the issuing country of an inter-
national currency has an incentive to choose a lower inﬂation rate than in autarky. The other
country, since the tax base is reduced due to the use of foreign currency, chooses a higher inﬂation
rate. However, there is a limit of the inﬂation rate beyond which it cannot sustain the circulation
of its national currency. If the governments act strategically in selecting equilibrium, the larger
country would try to lower the inﬂation rate to make its currency circulate internationally. The
other country, knowing this, may lower the inﬂation rate to maintain its national currency as
the sole medium of exchange to prevent the tax base from diminishing. This phenomenon would
not have arisen without the strategic interaction between the governments.
Another implication is on the cost and beneﬁt of having two international currencies. Our
model suggests that if the two countries are of similar size, they both lose by shifting from
autarky to the equilibrium with universally circulating currencies. This result is in contrast
to those in the previous studies with two-country two-currency search-theoretic models, which
argue that a uniﬁed currency regime is universally preferred. The diﬀerence lies in the fact that
the current model takes into account a negative eﬀect caused by competition on seigniorage
collection.
25One can study many other issues in the present framework, with some modiﬁcations and
extensions. First, we may be able to address issues on trade as well as monetary issues in a
uniﬁed framework. In the present model, the incentive to trade with foreigners is simply created
by expanded trade opportunities. If we consider international trade based on the comparative
advantage, some results may still be carried over. For example, if the gains from trade are not
too large, then trade liberalization policy may decrease the welfare of the country that starts
using foreign currency.
Next, the equilibrium with two local currencies entails no international trade, which is not
the case in reality. Zhou (1997) introduces preference shocks to Matsuyama et al. (1993) to
induce currency exchange between agents so that they engage in international trade, while both
currencies remain local. Another possibility is to introduce a currency exchange market. One
way is to endogenize the matching process so that they can go to the market whenever they
wish to exchange their money. One can also consider proﬁt-maximizing ﬁnancial intermediaries
or central banks to exchange currencies with other agents.
A more challenging modiﬁcation is to relax the assumption on indivisibility of ﬁat currencies
and restriction on inventory holding to discuss issues on inﬂation and exchange rates.18 To do
so, one must overcome the problem of tracking inventory, which is a diﬃcult task even in models
with a single currency (see, for example, Green and Zhou 1998 and Kamiya and Shimizu 2004).19
Finally, introducing more than two currencies in the present model may help us to address
issues on currency zoning. For example, some countries such as Turkey that has been using
dollar face a new alternative of Euro, and it is not clear which currency they end up using. It
is interesting to know whether or not the circulation of two international currencies increases
welfare, and its implications on the policies of the governments whose currencies circulate only
locally and of the governments issuing international currencies.
18The autarkic equilibrium in this model may disappear if both goods and money are divisible, and if the
marginal cost of production at zero output level is zero. We thank Shouyong Shi for pointing out this possibility.
19Head and Shi (2003) gets around this problem by using a continuum-of-household-members model with two
currencies and two countries to study the eﬀects of inﬂation on exchange rates. However, it does not consider
various currency regimes, interaction between governments, and relationship between regimes and governments’
behavior.
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